The question sounds like a yes or no, and the honest answer is that it depends on who is asking. The Wi-Fi network you joined still sees the address your device uses on that link, VPN or not. An ordinary website, on the other hand, usually never receives your Wi-Fi address in the first place. Five checks separate those two observers and tell you which one you actually care about.

Check 1: what does the access point see?

A hotel network can list your connected device while your browser traffic travels inside an encrypted tunnel. Both observations are true at once, because the network has to talk to a local device and does not need to read your pages to do it.

The address it sees may be the hardware address burned into the adapter or an operating-system-generated private address. If you handed over a room number or a guest account to get online, that admission record sits next to the device record and outlives your VPN session.

Changing VPN servers does nothing to those local records. They were created before any tunnel existed.

Check 2: what does a website see?

Routers forward IP packets between links, and the link-layer address used on your Wi-Fi is not an envelope that travels unchanged to every destination. For traffic leaving through a VPN, the site generally sees the exit's public IP address.

It can still receive cookies, a logged-in session and browser characteristics that identify your client software. Fingerprinting is a real tracking method, and it is not the same thing as reading a Wi-Fi MAC from a web request.

So if your threat model is a website correlating you across visits, the VPN exit and your browser state are the relevant surface. Your Wi-Fi adapter's address is not part of that conversation. That is why a VPN can change what a site knows about you while leaving the local network's view completely intact. Two layers, two observers, no contradiction.

Check 3: is the VPN bridged or routed?

Most consumer VPNs are routed: a TUN interface carries IP packets, and the guest operating system's virtual adapter has its own addressing context. Nothing about your Wi-Fi frame reaches the far side.

Some private-network VPNs bridge Ethernet frames instead, using a TAP interface. In that design, MAC-level information can cross into the remote segment, which is why the blanket claim that no MAC address can ever cross any VPN is too strong.

If you are debugging that kind of setup, name the interface the address belongs to: the physical Wi-Fi adapter, the virtual adapter, or a remote bridged segment. They are three different answers and people mix them constantly.

Check 4: do you want a different local identifier?

Apple and Android both support private or randomized Wi-Fi addresses. The feature reduces reliance on a persistent wireless identifier, with behaviour that varies by device, network and software version. Apple's documentation describes per-network addresses and persistence options on supported systems.

What it does not do is hide the address currently in use. The access point still needs an address to send frames to, so private addressing changes continuity, not visibility. Read the setting as a privacy control for tracking across networks, not as a way to become anonymous on the one you are using. Those are different promises, and only the first one is on offer.

If a managed network refuses to admit a device using private addressing, check the network's documented requirements before assuming the VPN is at fault. A VPN cannot repair a failure that happens before the device has ordinary network access.

Check 5: what are you actually trying to prevent?

Write the goal in one sentence. If it is stop this café from recognising my device tomorrow, private addressing is the control and a VPN is irrelevant. If it is stop this website from seeing my home address, the VPN exit is the control and the MAC never mattered.

If it is stop a remote private network from learning my adapter address, check whether the tunnel is bridged, because that is the only design where the question has a real answer.

Use a public-IP check to inspect the exit route, and the device's private-address setting to inspect local wireless identity. They answer different questions, and the Apple private Wi-Fi address documentation is a good reference for the second one. Neither setting makes an active device invisible to the network it joined, and no VPN changes what the access point already recorded.

Lahatsoratra mifandraika